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Abstract
This paper explores a dynamic two-country model with production externalities in
which capital goods are not traded and international lending and borrowing are allowed.
Unlike the integrated world economy model based on the Heckscher-Ohlin setting, our
model yields indeterminacy of equilibrium under a wider set of parameter values than in
the corresponding closed economy model. Our ﬁnding demonstrates that the assumption
on trade structure would be a relevant determinant in considering the relation between
globalization and economic volatility.
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Does globalization enhance economic volatility? The equilibrium business cycle theory based
on indeterminacy and sunspots has presented two diﬀerent answers to this question. On the
one hand, Meng (2003), Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004) and Weder (2001) show that
small-open economies with production externalities yield indeterminacy of equilibrium under
a wider set of parameter values than in the corresponding closed economy model. Hence,
according to these studies, globalization of an economy may increase economic volatility.1
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), on the other hand, examine a dynamic Hecksher-Ohlim
model of the two-country world in which there are country-speciﬁc production externalities.
They show that the world economy has the same conditions for equilibrium (in)determinacy
as those for a closed economy counterpart. In addition, Sim and Ho (2007) ﬁnd that if one of
the two counties has no production externalities in Nishimura and Shimomura’s model, then
the equilibrium path of the world economy would be determinate even though the country
with production externalities exhibits autarkic indeterminacy. These studies indicate that
globalization does not necessarily enhance economic ﬂuctuations.
At the ﬁrst sight, the opposite results shown above seem to stem from the diﬀerence in
the analytical frameworks used by the foregoing studies. The small-open economy models
are based on the partial equilibrium analysis in which behavior of the rest of the world is
exogenously given. In contrast, the models of world economy employ the general equilibrium
approach that treats the world economic system as a closed economy consisting of multiple
countries. Therefore, the behavior of an integrated world economy would be close to the
behavior of closed economy counterpart. One may conjecture that such a diﬀerence would
generate the contrasting views as to the destabilizing eﬀect of globalization.
The purpose of this paper is to reveal that the diﬀerence in conclusions mentioned above
mainly comes from the assumptions on trade structures rather than from the modelling
strategies. To conﬁrm this, we re-examine the world economy model under alternative trade
structures. In particular, we focus on the case where capital goods are not internationally
1Lahiri (2001) also examines indeterminacy in a small-open economy model. Since he uses a framework
diﬀerent from the one used by Meng (2003) and others, his model needs a relatively high degree of external
increasing returns to yield indeterminacy. Yong and Meng (2004) and Zhang (2008) also discuss equilibrium
indeterminacy in small-open economies.
2traded but there are international lending and borrowing. Our main ﬁnding is that the
equilibrium indeterminacy conditions for the world economy with non-traded investment
goods and ﬁnancial transactions are similar to the stability conditions for the small-open
economy models that have the same trade structure. More speciﬁcally, we show that our
model may exhibit indeterminacy regardless of the restrictions on the preference structure.
The closed-economy version of our model, which is essentially the same as the world economy
model examined by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) needs a high elasticity of intertemporal
substitution in consumption to hold indeterminacy. We also show that if investment goods
are tradable but consumption goods are not traded, then the dynamic behavior of the world
economy is essential the same as that of the Heckscher-Ohlin framework. In this sense, the
structure of international trade is a relevant determinant for the relation between globalization
and volatility.
2T h e M o d e l
Consider a world economy consisting of two countries, home and foreign. Both countries
have the same production technologies. In each country there is a continuum of identical,
inﬁnitely-lived households. All the agents in both countries have an identical time discount
rate and the same form of instantaneous felicity function. The only diﬀerence between the
two countries is the initial stock of wealth held by the households in each country.
2.1 Production
The home country has two production sectors. The ﬁrst sector (i =1 )produces investment
goods and the second sector (i =2 ) produces pure consumption goods. The production





i ¯ Xi,a i > 0,b i > 0, 0 <a i + bi < 1,i =1 ,2
where Yi, Ki and Li are i-th sector’s output, capital and labor input, respectively. Here, ¯ Xi
denotes the sector and country-speciﬁc production externalities. We deﬁne:




i ,a i < αi < 1, αi + bi < 1 i =1 ,2.
3If we normalizes the number of producers to one, then it holds that ¯ Ki = Ki and ¯ Li =
Li (i =1 ,2) in equilibrium. This means that the i-th sector’s social production technology





i ,i =1 ,2. (1)
Hence, the social technology satisﬁes constant returns to scale, while the private technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale.2
The factor and product markets are competitive, so that the private marginal product
















where w is the real wage rate, r is the rental rate of capital and p denotes the price of
investment good in terms of the consumption good.
The production technologies of the foreign country are the same as those of the home























where variables with an asterisk denote foreign variables.
2.2 Households
We assume that the households in the home country access the international ﬁnancial market
where foreign bonds are freely traded. By trading bonds, the households in the home country







e−ρtdt, σ > 0, ρ > 0
2This speciﬁcation of production technology was ﬁrst introduced by Behbhabib and Nishimura (1998).
Benhabib et al. (2000), Meng (2003), Meng and Velasco (2003, 2004), Mino (2001) and Nishimura and
Shimomura (2002) utilize the same functional forms.
4subject to the ﬂow budget constraint
˙ Ω = RΩ + w + π1 + π2 − C, (4)











and the initial value of Ω0. In the above, C is consumption, R denotes interest rate, πi is the
excess proﬁts in the i-th sector3 and Ω is the net wealth (in terms of the consumption goods).
The net wealth of held by the household consists of domestic capital and foreign bonds:
Ω = pK + B,
where B denotes the stock of foreign bonds (in terms of the consumption goods). When select-




The deﬁnition of net wealth yields ˙ Ω = p ˙ K + ˙ pK + ˙ B. Thus, the ﬂow budget constraint
(4) can be rewritten as






pK + w + π1 + π2 − C − p ˙ K.
The non-arbitrage condition between holding capital and bond means that the net rate
of return to capital equals the real interest on bonds:
r
p




where δ ∈ [0,1) denotes the rate of capital depreciation. As a consequence, the optimization
problem for the representative household in the home country is to maximize U by controlling
C and I subject to the following constraints:
˙ B = RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − C − pI, (6)
˙ K = I − δK, (7)
3Remember that the private technology exhinits decreasing returns to scale with respect to capital and
labor.
5together with the initial holdings of K0 and B0. In this reformulation, the no-Ponzi-game










Bt ≥ 0. (8)




+ λ[RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − C − pI]+q(I − δK),
where λ and q respectively denote the implicit price of the foreign bonds and domestic capital.
Focusing on an interior solution, we see that the necessary conditions for an optimum are:
C−σ = λ (9a)
pλ = q, (9b)
˙ λ = λ(ρ − R), (9c)
˙ q = q(ρ + δ) − λr = q
µ





The optimization conditions also involve the transverslity conditions on holding B and K:
limt→∞ λe−ρtB =0and limt→∞ qe−ρtK =0 .
Since the foreign households have the same preference structure, their optimization con-
ditions corresponding to (9a), (9b), (9c) and (9d) are as follows:
C∗−σ = λ∗, (10a)
p∗λ∗ = q∗, (10b)
˙ λ
∗
= λ∗ (ρ − R), (10c)
˙ q∗ = q∗
µ





It is to be noted that while the interest rate, R, is common for both countries, the real rate of
return to capital in the foreign country, r∗/p∗, may diﬀer from r/p, because in our framework
the factor-price equalization fails to hold out of the steady state.
62.3 Market Equilibrium Conditions
We assume that consumption goods are internationally traded but investment goods are non-
tradables.4 Although such an assumption is restrictive one, it helps to elucidate the role of
trade structure in a dynamic world economy. Moreover, a large portion of investment goods
are construction and structures, so that the investment goods sector shares a larger part
of non-tradables than the consumption good sector.5 Since investment goods are traded in
the domestic markets alone and consumption goods are internationally traded, the market
equilibrium conditions for investment and consumption goods are respectively given by
Y1 = I, Y∗
1 = I∗, (11)
Y2 + Y ∗
2 = C + C∗, (12)
where I and I∗ are gross investment expenditures in the home and foreign countries, respec-
tively. Physical capital in each country accumulates according to
˙ K = I − δK, ˙ K∗ = I∗ − δK∗. (13)
As for the factor markets, we follow the standard Heckscher-Ohlin modelling: it is assumed
that capital and labor are perfectly shiftable between the production sectors within a country,
but they cannot move across the borders. Therefore, the full-employment conditions for
production factors in each country are the following:






We assume that labor supply in each country is ﬁxed and normalized to one.
Finally, the equilibrium condition for the bond market is
B + B∗ =0 ,
4The structure of our model is one of the dependent economy models discussed in open-economy macro-
economics literature. Turnovsky and Sen (1995) treat a small-open economy model with non-tradable capital
and Turnovsky (1997, Chapter 7) studies a neoclassical two-country, two-sector model in which capital goods
are not traded. Mino (2008) also discusses the similar two-country model with external increasing returns.
See also Chapter 5 in Turnousky (2009) for a brief literature review.
5Bems (2008) ﬁnds that the share of investment expenditure on non-traded goods is about 60% and that
this ﬁgure has been considerably stable over the last 50 years both in developed and developing countries.
7which means that Ω+Ω∗ = K+K∗. Bonds are IOUs between the home and foreign households
and, hence, the aggregate stock of bonds is zero in the world ﬁnancial market at large.
3 Volatility of the World Economy
3.1 Dynamic System
In equilibrium it holds that ¯ Ki = Ki, ¯ Li = Li, ¯ K∗
i = K∗
i and ¯ L∗
i = Li (i =1 ,2). From (2a),





















where ki = Ki/Li and k∗
i = K∗
i /L∗
i (i =1 ,2). By use of (15a),(15b),(15c) and (15d), we















































































α2−α1 ≡ k2 (p∗).
These expressions show that











i (p∗)=sign (α2 − α1),i =1 ,2. (18)
In the above, the sign of a1/b1 − a2/b2 represents the factor intensity ranking from the
private perspective, while sign (α1 − α2) expresses the factor intensity ranking from the
social perspective.
8In this paper we restrict our attention to the interior equilibrium in which both countries
imperfectly specialize. To ensure this restriction, we assume that relative price in each country
satisﬁes the following condition:
L1 =
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
∈ (0,1),L ∗
1 =
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
∈ (0,1). (19)
Using functions k1 (p) and k2 (p), we see that capital accumulation equation in each country
is written as
˙ K = y1 (K,p) − δK, (20a)
˙ K∗ = y1 (K∗,p ∗) − δK∗, (20b)
where y1 (K,p) and y1 (K∗,p ∗) express the supply functions of investment goods given by
y1 (K,p) ≡
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 ,
y1 (K∗,p ∗) ≡
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A1k1 (p∗)
α1 .






















(α1 − α2). (21b)
The shadow values of capital in both countries change according to
˙ q = q[ρ + δ − ˆ r(p)], (22a)
˙ q∗ = q∗ [ρ + δ − ˆ r(p∗)], (22b)
where ˆ r(p) ≡ r/p = a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 and ˆ r(p∗) ≡ r∗/p∗ = a1A1k1 (p∗)
α1−1 . Dynamic equa-
tions (20a), (20b), (22a) and (22b) depict behaviors of capital stocks and their implicit prices
i nt h eh o m ea n df o r e i g nc o u n t r i e s .
The optimization conditions (9c) and (10c) mean that λ/λ∗ stays constant over time and,
therefore, from (9a) and (10a) the relative consumption, C/C∗, also stays constant even out
of the steady state. Let us denote C∗/C =( λ∗/λ)−1/σ =¯ m(> 0). Then the world market
equilibrium condition for consumption goods given by (12) becomes
(1 + ¯ m)λ− 1
σ = y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗), (23)
9where
y2 (K,p)=
k1 (p) − K




k1 (p∗) − K∗
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A2k2 (p∗)
α2 .
The supply functions of consumption goods satisfy the following:
sign y2
K (K,p)=sign y2



















(α1 − α2). (24b)
In view of (23), we see that λ is expressed as a function of capital stocks, prices and ¯ m :
λ =( 1 + ¯ m)
σ [y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗)]−σ
≡ λ(K,K∗,p,p ∗;¯ m). (25)








Solving these equations with respect to p and p∗ presents the following expressions:
p = π(K,K∗,q,q∗;¯ m),p ∗ = π∗ (K,K∗,q,q∗;¯ m). (26)
Substituting (26) into (20a), (20b), (22a) and (22b), we obtain a complete dynamic system
of K, K∗,qand q∗.
3.2 Conditions for Equilibrium Indeterminacy
To discuss equilibrium determinacy of the world economy, we ﬁrst conﬁrm that the equilib-
rium paths of capital stocks and the relative prices in both coutries are independent of the
level of ¯ m.
Lemma 1 The steady-state levels of K, K∗,qand q∗ are uniquely given and they are inde-
pendent of the level of ¯ m,
Proof. See Appendix 1.
10We ﬁrst characterize the stationary equilibrium of the world economy. The steady state
of the dynamic system derived above is established when ˙ K = ˙ K∗ = ˙ q = ˙ q∗ =0 . From
(26) t h er e l a t i v ep r i c ei nt h eh o m ea n df o r e i g nc o u n t r i e s ,p and p∗, also stay constant in the
steady-state equilibrium. As for the existence of a feasible steady state, we can conﬁrm the
following:
Proposition 2 Suppose that both countries imperfectly specialize in the steady state. Then
t h es t e a d y - s t a t ev a l u e so fK, K∗,pand p∗ are uniquely determined. Additionally, if ¯ m is
ﬁxed, the steady-state levels of q and q∗ are uniquely given as well.
Proof. See Appendix 2.
It is worth noting that while the steady-state levels of K, K∗,pand p∗ are independent
of ¯ m, the steady-state values of q and q∗ depend on ¯ m. Therefore, the presence of a unique
set of steady state levels of q and q∗ critically depends upon our assumption that the value
of ¯ m is exogenously given. To complete our analysis on the steady-state equilibrium, we
should consider how ¯ m is determined. Before discussing this problem, let us explore the local
determinacy of the steady-state equilibrium under a given level of ¯ m.
Proposition 3 Under a given level of ¯ m, the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy
is locally indeterminate, if the investment good sector is more capital intensive than the con-
sumption good sector from the social perspective but it is less capital intensive from the private
perspective.6
Proof. See Appendix 3 .
Proposition 2 claims that in our model equilibrium indeterminacy may emerge regardless
of the magnitude of σ. This is in contrast to the conclusion of the Nishimura and Shimomura
(2002) who show that, in addition to the conditions given in Proposition 2, the elasticity
of intertemporal substitution in consumption, 1/σ,s h o u l db eh i g ht oh o l di n t e r m e d i a c y . 7
6We can also show that, as well as in the NS model, our model holds equilibrium determinacy, if the
factor-intensity rankings are the same both from private and social perspectives.






(1 − α1)a2b1(ρ + δ)+α1a1 [ρb2 + δb1a2 +( 1− a1)b2δ]
(a2b1 − a1b2)(α1 − α2)[ρ + δ(1 − a1)]

.
11Since the closed economy version of our model is the same as the integrated world economy
model dicussed by Nishimura and Shimomura (2002), we need the same condition for holding
indeterminacy if our model economy is closed. Hence, our result shows that the ﬁnancially
integrated world with non-tradable capital goods may produce indeterminacy under a wider
range of parameter spaces than in the closed economy counterpart. In this sense, our model
indicates that globalization may enhance the possibility of sunspot-driven economic ﬂuctua-
tions.8
We now consider how to determine ¯ m. Using the market equilibrium condition for the
investment goods in (11) and the factor income distribution relation such that pY1 + Y2 =




2, we ﬁnd that the dynamic equation
of foreign bonds are expressed as
˙ B = RB + Y2 − C, ˙ B∗ = RB∗ + Y ∗
2 − C∗.
These equations represent the current accounts of both countries. In view of the no-Ponzi
game and the transversality conditions, the intertemporal constraint for the current account













































Since it holds that C∗




















y2 (Kt,p t)dt + B0
. (27)
8The indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 2 require that constant returns prevail in each production
sector and that the external eﬀects associated with capital are larger in the investment good sector than in the
consumption good sector. Several investigations on scale economies have suggested that our indeterminacy
conditions are not unrealistic. For example, the well-cited study by Basu and Fernald (1997) ﬁnd that most
industries in the US approximately exhibit constant returns to scale, which may support our assumption of
social constant returns. Using the US data, Harrison (2003) claims that returns to scale of the consumption
goods sector are close to be constant, while the investment goods sector exhibits weak increasing returns. In
addition, she reveals that external eﬀects may be larger in the investment good sector than in the consumption
good sector. However, the existing studies do not present direct empirical evidence for our discussion. Since
the indeterminacy conditions in Proposition 2 are frequently used in the literature, it is a relevant task to ﬁnd
more convincing empirical support.
12Equation (27) demonstrates that ¯ m depends on the initial holdings of bonds, B0 and B∗
0,
as well as on the discounted present value of consumption goods produced in each country. It
is to be noticed that the discounted present values of consumption goods are independent of





























where Y 2 ≡ y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗) denotes the aggregate supply of consumption goods in the
















λ∗ = R + δ − ˆ r(p∗). (29b)
Substituting (20a), (20b), (29a), and (29b) into (28) yields the following:




















Y 2 (R + δ − ˆ r(p)) +
Y 2
p∗p∗
Y 2 (R + δ − ˆ r(p∗))
#
.
Observe that each side of the above equation does not involve ¯ m. Solving the above with
respect to R, we ﬁnd that the equilibrium level of the world interest rate can be expressed as
a function of K,K∗,pand p∗ :
R = R(K,K∗,p,p ∗). (30)
Consequently, by use of (20a), (20b), (29a), (29b) and (30), we obtain an alternative
expression of the complete dynamic system of (K,K∗,p,p ∗) in such a way that
˙ K = y1 (K,p) − δK,
˙ K∗ = y1 (K∗,p ∗) − δK∗,
˙ p = p[R(K,K∗,p,p ∗)+δ − ˆ r(p)],
˙ p∗ = p∗ [R(K,K∗,p,p ∗)+δ − ˆ r(p∗)].
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
(31)
From (9c) the steady-state level of interest rate satisﬁes R = ρ.9 Since the dynamic system
(31) does not involve ¯ m, if the steady state is locally determinate (i.e. the linearized dynamic
9We can show that dynamic analysis of (31) presents the same conclusion as that stated in Proposition
2. However, since function (30) is rather complex, stability analysis is more cumbersome than that shown in
Appendix 2.
13system has two stable roots), then the equilibrium path of pt and p∗
t are uniquely expressed as
functions of Kt and K∗
t on the two-dimensional stable manifold. When we denote the relation
between the relative prices and capital stocks on the stable saddle path as p = φ(K,K∗) and
p∗ = φ∗ (K,K∗), the behaviors of capital stocks on the saddle path are expressed as
˙ K = y1 (K,φ(K,K∗)) − δK,
˙ K∗ = y1 (K∗,φ∗ (K,K∗)) − δK∗.
These diﬀerential equations show that once the initial capital stocks, K0 and K∗
0, are speciﬁed,
the paths of {Kt,K∗
t }
∞




are also uniquely given under the speciﬁed levels of K0 and K∗
0. This means that when
equilibrium determinacy holds, the level of ¯ m given by (27) is also uniquely selected under
the given initial levels of K0,K ∗
0,B 0 and B∗
0.
In contrast, if the converging path of (31) is indeterminate (that is, the linearly approxi-
mated dynamic system of (31) has three or four stable roots), then the given initial levels of
K0 and K∗
0 alone cannot pin down the equilibrium paths of pt and p∗
t. Therefore, the level of
¯ m determined by (27) becomes indeterminate as well. In this situation, we should specify ex-
pectations formation of agents to select a particular path leading to the steady state. Once we
specify a particular trajectory of the world economy with self-fulﬁlling expectations, we can
determine the value of ¯ m that satisfy (27). However, such an equilibrium path may ﬂuctuate
if a sunspot shock hits the world economy, so that ¯ m is also aﬀected by expectations-driven
ﬂuctuations.
In the steady state it holds that ˙ B = ˙ B∗ =0and R = ρ. Thus the steady-state level of
bond holdings in both countries are given by
B =
y2 (K,p) − C
ρ
=
¯ m − 1
ρ(1 + ¯ m)
y2 (K,p), (32a)
B∗ =
y2 (K,p) − ¯ mC
ρ
=
1 − ¯ m
ρ(1 + ¯ m)
y2 (K,p). (32b)
The above expressions show that when ¯ m is selected, the long-run asset position of each
country is also determined. It is obvious that whether the home country becomes a creditor
or a debtor in the long run depends solely on whether or not ¯ m exceeds one. As (27)
demonstrates, if the equilibrium path is determinate and if the initial stocks of capital and
14bonds held by the home households are relatively large, then the home country tends to be a
creditor in the long-run equilibrium. However, if there is a continuum of covering path around
the steady state, the value of ¯ m determined by (27) is aﬀected by the expectations formation
of agents. This implies that in the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy, the initial holding
of wealth in each country does not necessarily determine the asset position of that country
in the long-run equilibrium.
To sum up, we have shown:
Proposition 4 If the steady-state equilibrium of the world economy is locally determinate
(indeterminate), then the steady-state level of asset position of each country is determinate
(indeterminate).
4 The Role of Trade Structure
In this section we compare indeterminacy conditions for the model under alternative trade
structures. The purpose of this section is to give an intuitive implication for the reason why
the shape of utility functions do not relate to the indeterminacy condition when investment
goods are not internationally traded. We ﬁrst consider the Heckscher-Ohlin modelling and
then reconsider our model. Finally, we examine the opposite setting to our model where
consumptions goods are not traded but investment goods are tradable.
4.1 The Heckscher-Ohlin Setting
In the Hecksher-Ohlin framework used by Nishimra and Shimomura (2002), both investment
and consumption goods are internationally traded but there is no ﬁnancial exchange. We
focus on the case where neither home nor foreign countries specialize. Since both goods are
traded, both countries face the same relative price. This means that under the assumption
of symmetric technologies between the two countries, both home and foreign ﬁrms in each
production sector select the same capital intensity as long as both countries imperfectly
specialize. Hence, it holds that ki (p)=k∗
i (p)( i =1 ,2) for all t ≥ 0. Thus the world market
equilibrium condition for investment goods, ˙ K+δK+ ˙ K∗+δK∗ = Y1+Y ∗
1 , yields the capital
15f o r m a t i o ne q u a t i o ns u c ht h a t
˙ Kw =
Kw − 2k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
− δKw, (33)
where Kw = K + K∗ denotes the world level of capital stock. In addition, since ﬁrms
in both countries choose the same capital intensities, the factor prices are also equalized
between the two countries, that is, ˆ r∗(p)=ˆ r(p) and w∗ (p)=w(p), implying that the
dynamic equation of the shadow value of capital in the foreign country (22b) is replaced with
˙ q∗ = q∗ (ρ + δ − ˆ r(p)). Consequently, (22a) shows that q∗/q stays constant over time and
that the complete dynamic system of the world economy is given by (22a), (33) and the
world market equilibrium condition for consumption goods:
Y2 + Y ∗
2 = C + C∗ ⇒ (1 + ¯ m)q =
2k1 (p) − Kw
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
, (34)
where ¯ m is a positive constant deﬁned as ¯ m = C/C∗ =( q/q∗)
−1/σ . Given ¯ m, the equilibrium
relative price can be expressed as p = π(Kw,q;¯ m). Substituting this function into (22a) and
(33), we obtain a complete dynamic system with respect to Kw and q.This aggregate dynamic
system is essentially the same as the closed economy model in Benhabib and Nishimura
(1998).10 As a consequence, the intuitive implication of the indeterminacy conditions for the
Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) is essentially the same as those for the case of a closed
economy.
Now suppose that a sunspot shock hits the world economy and all the households in the
world expect that the rates of return to their capital will increase. This raises the marginal
values of capital, q and q∗. If σ is suﬃciently small the intertermporal substitution eﬀect
dominates the income eﬀect, then households reduce consumption and invest more, which
leads to higher level of world capital, Kw. As we have assumed that the consumption good
sector is more capital intensive from the private perspective, (34) shows that an increase in
Kw raises consumption goods production relative to the investment goods. This increases
the price of investment good p, and the ﬁrms select a lower capital intensity because the
10Nishimura and Shimomura (2002) show that the steady-state levels of Kw and p are uniquely given. Dis-
tribution of capital stock between the two countries depends on the initial holdings of capital if the equilibrium
path of the world economy is determinate. They also conﬁrm that the long-run distribution of capital (so
the long-run trade patterns) becomes indeterminate, if the steady state of the dynamic system of the world
economy is a sink.
16social technology of the capital goods is more capital intensive than that of the consumption
good sector (see (18)). Consequently, the rate of return to capital in the world economy will
increase and the sunspot-driven expectations are self-fulﬁlled.
In contrast, if σ is large enough, the income eﬀect dominates the intertemporal substitu-
tion eﬀect and, hence, a sunspot deriven expected rise in the marginal value of capital may
increase consumption. As a result, investment in the world will decrease and the relative
price of investment goods, p, declines. In view of (18), al o w e rp reduces the rate of return
to capital so that the initial change in expectations is not self-fulﬁlled.
4.2 Non-Tradable Investment Goods
Unlike the Heckscher-Ohlin modelling, we have assumed that investment goods are not trad-
able and international lending and borrowing are allowed. Again, suppose that households
in both countries expect that the rates of return to their capital will increase. Then house-
holds intend to rise their investment. In the Heckscher-Ohlin environment, this requires that
households reduce their current consumption, and thus the magnitude of σ plays a pivotal
role. In our model, however, households may increase their real investment by borrowing
from foreign households rather than decrease their current consumption levels. If households
in both countries try to borrow in the international ﬁnancial market, the world interest rate,
R, will increase. From (31) w es e et h a tah i g h e rR raises the price of investment goods, p
and p∗, in both countries. 11Given the factor intensity ranking conditions in Proposition 2,
higher levels of p and p∗ decrease capital intensities and the rates of retune to capital, r and
r∗, actually increase. In other words, the presence of bond market cuts oﬀ the direct link
between the current consumption and real investment held in the Heckscher-Ohlin model (as
well as in the closed economy model).
The above intuition is conﬁrmed more clearly in the small-open economy model explored
by Meng and Velasco (2004) and others. They also assume that investment goods are not
traded but international lending and borrowing are possible. Since the world interest rate is
11Precisely speaking, a rise in the interest rate does not necessarily increases the relative prices, if the
economy out of the steady state. We have restricted we restrict our attention to the local dynamic around the
steady state, where it holds that R =ˆ r(p
∗) − δ = R − ˆ r(p
∗ − δ) at the outset.
17given for a small country, the dynamic behavior of the small-open economy are described by
˙ K = y1 (K,p) − δK,
˙ p = p
£ ¯ R + δ − ˆ r(p)
¤
,
where ¯ R denotes a given world interest rate. Since the shadow value of capital follows
˙ q = q
¡
δ + ρ − ¯ R
¢
, it is assumed that δ + ρ = ¯ R to keep q at a ﬁnite level. As a result, the
current level of consumption, which satisﬁes C−σ = q, stays constant as well. In this extreme
case, the interest rate will not respond to a rise in investment, there is no link between the
current levels of savings and consumption, so that the dynamic behavior of the economy
is independent of the preference structure. Meng and Velasco (2003 and 2004.) show that
the factor-ranking conditions shown Proposition 2 are the necessary and suﬃcient conditions
for indeterminacy. In our general equilibrium modelling, the world interest rate changes as
investment in the world economy increases. This is why the factor-ranking conditions are
suﬃcient but not necessary for indeterminacy in our model. However, since we have focused
on the local behavior of the world economy around the symmetric steady state where both
countries hold the same level of capital, our indeterminacy conditions are closed to those for
the small-open economy with non-tradable investment goods.
4.3 Non-Tradable Consumption Goods
We now consider the opposite situation where the consumption goods are not internationally
traded, but the investment goods are tradable and ﬁnancial capital mobility is possible. In
this case the commodity market equilibrium conditions are given by
I + I∗ = Y1 + Y ∗
1 ,C = Y2,C ∗ = Y ∗
2 .
We take the tradable investment good as a numareise. Then the net wealth held by the
domestic household (in terms of investment good) is Ω = B+K and the ﬂow budget constraint
is written as
˙ B = R(B + K)+w + π1 + π2 − ˆ pC − I.
where ˆ p (= 1/p) denotes the domestic price of consumption good in terms of investment good.




+ λ[RB + rK + w + π1 + π2 − ˆ pC − I]+q(I − δK)
18and the key ﬁrst-order conditions for an optimum are:
C−σ = λˆ p, (35a)
λ = q (35b)
˙ λ = λ(ρ − R), (35c)
˙ q = q(ρ + δ − r). (35d)
The key condition here is (35b):since investment goods are internationally tradable, capital
and international bonds are perfectly substitute each other so that their implicit prices have
are the same. This means tha, in view of (35c) and (35d),R= r − δ for all t ≥ 0.
Since households in both country face the same interest rate, R, the rate of returns to
capital in the foreign country satisﬁes
r∗ − δ = R = r − δ.
Therefore, r(p)=r(p∗) holds in each moment, implying that p always equals p∗. Thus the
world market equilibrium condition of investment good yields the dynamic equation of the
aggregate capital given by (??). In addition, from the equilibrium condition for consumption
goods in each country we obtain
C−1/σ = y2 (K, ˆ p),C ∗−1/σ = y2 (K∗, ˆ p),
w h e r ei th o l d st h a tC∗ =¯ mC. The above equilibrium conditions present (34). Therefore,
the dynamic system of the world economy is the same as that of the Nishimura-Shimomura
model.12 This conclusion demonstrates that our assumption of the absence of investment
goods trade plays a pivotal role for making our indeterminacy conditions diverge from those
for the model with Hechscher-Ohlin properties.13
12Noteice that in this subsection ˆ p denotes the consumption good price in terms of investment goods. It is
easy to see that the stability condition for the model in Section 4.1 are still the same if we replace p with 1/ˆ p.
13In this paper we focus on the decentralized economies. Our entire discussion can be reformu-










dt, by taking the sequences of external eﬀe c t sa sg i v e n .T h er e s o u r c ec o n s t r a i n t sf o r










and Y2 + Y
∗
2 = C + C
∗ in our model, and; (iii) Y1 + Y
∗
1 = I + I
∗,Y 2 = C and Y
∗
2 = C
∗ in the model with
195A F i n a l R e m a r k
The world economy as a whole is a closed economy in which there are heterogeneous coun-
tries. Therefore, its model structure is similar to that of a closed, single economy model with
heterogeneous agents. In particular, if consumption and saving decisions are made by the
representative household in each country, the world economy model is closely connected to
the closed economy model with heterogeneous households. There is, however, an important
diﬀerence between the world economy models and the single country setting: when dealing
with the world economy model, we should specify the trade structure between the coun-
tries. This paper has revealed that the assumption on trade structure may be critical for
the presence of equilibrium indeterminacy even if there is no international heterogeneity in
technologies and preferences. Several authors have explored recently how the presence of
heterogeneous preferences and technologies alter the determinacy/indeterminacy conditions
in the equilibrium business cycle models with market distortions. These studies have shown
that the heterogeneity in preferences and technologies often aﬀects stability condition in a
critical manner.14 In a similar vein, Sim and Ho (2007) ﬁnd that introducing technological
heterogeneity into the Nishimura-Shimomura model may produce a substantial change in
equilibrium indeterminacy results. Those existing ﬁndings suggest that it is worth extending
our model by considering further heterogeneity between the two countries.
Appendices
Appendix 1: Proof of Proposition 1.
When ˙ q = ˙ q∗ =0in (22a) and (22b), it holds that
a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 = a1A1k1 (p∗)
α1−1 = ρ + δ.
Thus by use of (15a) and (15c), we ﬁnd that
















non-tradable consumption goods. It is easy to conﬁrm that the optimization problem, subject to (iii) yields
the same equilibrium conditions as those for the optimization problem under (i). See Hu and Mino (2010) for
the detail.
14See, for example, Ghiglino and Olszak-Duquenne (2005).
20These conditions show that the steady-state levels of p and p∗ are uniquely given and it
holds that p = p∗ in the steady state. The steady-state levels of capital stocks satisfying
˙ K = ˙ K∗ =0in (20a) and (20b) are determined by the following conditions:
K − k2 (p)
k1 (p) − k2 (p)
A1k1 (p)
α1 = δK,
K∗ − k2 (p∗)
k1 (p∗) − k2 (p∗)
A1k1 (p∗)
α1 = δK∗.
Using the conditions for ˙ p = ˙ p∗ =0and the fact that p = p∗ holds in the steady state, we
conﬁrm that the steady-state level of capital stock in each county has the same value, which
is given by
K = K∗ =
(aA1)
1













which has a positive value. We also ﬁnd that the steady-state values of labor allocation to













Hence, (19) is fulﬁlled so that both countries imperfectly specialize. In addition, if ¯ m is ﬁxed,
from (23) the steady-state value of λ is uniquely determined as well, implying that q = pλ
and q∗ = p∗λ are also uniquely given in the steady state.
Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, the following facts are useful:




K∗ (K∗,p ∗),i =1 ,2,
yi
p (K,p)=yi








21Proof. By the functional forms of yi
j (·) (i =1 ,2,j= K,K∗,p,p ∗), it is easy to see
that yi
K (K,p)=yi
K∗ (K∗,p ∗) and yi
p (K,p)=yi
p∗ (K∗,p ∗) are established when p = p∗ and


















































Since λK(·)=λK∗ (·) and λp (·)=λp∗ (·) in the steady state where K = K∗ and p = p∗,w e
obtain πK = π∗
K = πK∗ = π∗, πq = π∗
q∗ and πq∗ = π∗
q.
Let us linealize the dynamic system of (20a), (20b ), (22a) and (22b) at the steady state.
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⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
.
22By use of Lemma 1, we see that the characteristic equation of J is written as
Γ(η)=d e t [ ηI − J]
=d e t
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
η − (y1






pπK η − (y1




qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πK η + qˆ r0πq qˆ r0πq∗
qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πq η + qˆ r0πq
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥













0 η − (y1
K − δ)0 η
qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πK η + qˆ r0πq qˆ r0πq∗
qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πK qˆ r0πq η + qˆ r0πq
⎤
⎥ ⎥









η + qˆ r0(πq − πq∗)
¤
ξ (η).
where η denotes the characteristic root of J and
ξ (η) ≡ η2 +
£













Our assumptions mean that a1
b1 − a2
b2 < 0 and α1 − α2 > 0. Thus from (24a) we see
that y1
K − δ < 0. In addition, equation (36c) shows that πq − πq∗ =1 /λ(> 0). Hence, using
ˆ r(p) ≡ a1A1k1 (p)
α1−1 , we obtain:





As a consequence, at least two roots of Γ(η)=0have negative real parts. Equations in (36c)
also show























y2 (K,p)+y2 (K∗,p ∗)
¤− 1
σ−1 < 0.
Therefore, in the steady state equilibrium. the following holds:










23Notice that under our assumptions, it holds that y2
p (K,p) > 0. Suppose that σ is small
enough to satisfy σ <p y 2





(πq + πq∗) < 0.
This means that ξ (η)=0has one positive and one negative roots. As a result, Γ(η)=0
has three stable roots. Hence, if σ is smaller than the price elasticity of supply function of
consumption goods, then there locally exists a continuum of equilibrium paths converging to
the steady state.
Now suppose that σ is larger than py2























p < 0 and y2






(πq + πq∗) > 0,







These conditions demonstrate that ξ (η)=0has two roots with negative real parts and,
hence, all the roots of Γ(η)=0a r es t a b l eo n e s . I ns u m ,i fa1
b1 − a2
b2 < 0 and α1 − α2 > 0,
then the characteristic equation of the linearlized system involves at least three stable roots,
implying that the converging path towards the steady state is locally indeterminate.
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